The Ores And The Allies

You know that feeling when the time comes to have the “chat” with your children? That sensation in your gut that feels like all the butterflies have decided to unite in one frantic kamikaze dive! Well, this topic is a little like that. We know that there is war in Europe, and where there is war, there are those who must respond to it and those who profit from the demand it creates. 

In civilian industry, traceability has become a compliance norm. The digital Battery Passport, mandated under EU 2023/1542, represents the first fully traceable supply chain for an industrial product class in Europe, and it offers a regulatory blueprint that defence procurement could adapt. 

Now imagine applying that same logic to defence manufacturing in Europe, where every radar magnet, missile actuator, or alloy component could carry a verified digital record of its material journey.

The strategic case

Modern defence systems rely on complex, multi-tiered supply chains that extend far beyond Europe's borders. A single F-35 fighter jet may contain over 417 kilograms of critical raw materials, tungsten, dysprosium, cobalt, and rare earth magnets sourced from half a dozen countries. A Virginia-class submarine, over 4170 kilos, and an Aegis-class destroyer, 2358 kilos. While these figures reflect the embedded weight of components rather than pure elemental mass, they illustrate the underlying dependency: thousands of kilograms of strategically sensitive materials embedded in each platform.*

The Conundrum: Why Traceability Still Meets Resistance.

So why would we need a materials passport in the world of defence manufacturing? I was once told, during a meeting with a defence manufacturer, that “we don't need traceability because all of our kit** explodes over the battlefield.”  That mindset might suit legacy logistics, but in a world of sanctions, technology embargoes, and circular-resource mandates, ignorance is not resilience.

So the conundrum is clear: should we invest so much time, effort, and money into tracing multi-tiered supply chains that stretch far beyond Europe’s borders when much of the output may be destined for destruction??

 A materials passport would: 

· Track provenance: recording where each strategic material was mined, processed, and assembled.

· Verified compliance: ensuring alignment with the EU Critical Raw Materials Act and ethical sourcing standards.

· Enable circularity: documenting alloys and components that can be recovered, reused, or recycled at end-of-life. Remember, not everything developed by the military-industrial complex explodes on the battlefield; there can be a capable and practicable recovery of valuable materials.

· Strengthen security: give procurement officers visibility into potential exposure to non-allied suppliers or sanctioned jurisdictions. 

From Compliance to Capability.

Such a framework could sit under the European Defence Agency’s ‘Materials for Defence’ coordination platform or align with the NATO DIANA initiative on supply-chain integrity.

Now, the big question…would it work? What would be needed, and how would it benefit the EU’s defensive stance from a manufacturing position? The passport could become a living compliance document that would be, in effect, part sustainability record and part security audit trail. Each certified supplier would upload verified data (origin, batch IDs, processing methods) into a secure, encrypted register. Sub-assemblies would inherit digital certificates, much like serial numbers or QR codes for batteries, embedded in parts documentation. Progress would occur when systems are serviced or decommissioned, establishing a connected line of data back to the passport and creating an unbroken chain of custody. This concept is not speculative; distributed-ledger traceability systems already underpin EU pilot projects in cobalt and tungsten supply chains, providing a technical foundation for a secure defence ‘materials passport.’

 Again, just a thought, but it is a consideration about the direction we ought to take. Is it a “birds and the bees” type of discussion, uncomfortable with an urge to finish quickly? Or, maybe it is more of an ‘Ores and Allies’ talk, an honest conversation about where our strategic materials come from, who we depend on, and how transparent we are willing to be when defence readiness meets resource reality. If Europe’s future arsenal is to be both ethical and autonomous, then this uncomfortable conversation isn’t optional. It is overdue.

#DefenceIndustry #SupplyChainSecurity #CriticalRawMaterials #EU #Ireland #Traceability #Sustainability #Procurement #Innovation

*I checked these figures from a 2013 Strategic Report (Congressional Research Service), but I feel the weights are more aligned with component weight, more so than actual mineral and material weight.

 **He didn’t say “kit”… it just rhymed with it.